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CoNFLICT oF LA.ws--EFFECT oF FoRuM's STATUTE OF FRAuns ON FoREIGN
ORAL CoNTRACT TO BEQUEATH PROPERTY-Plaintiff brought an action in
New York for specific performance of an oral agreement allegedly made by
testator in Florida not to change his will without plaintiff's consent. Defendant's motions for dismissal of the complaint and summary judgment were
dismissed. The appellate division on reargument entered orders reversing the
lower court. On plaintiff's appeal to the court of appeals, held, affirmed.
The New York Personal Property Law,1 which states that oral contracts to
bequeath property are void, is controlling, regardless of whether this section
of the statute of frauds is procedural or substantive. If the section is procedural, the law of the forum would apply making the oral contract unenforceable; if substantive, the contract is void because the statute is an
expression of the public policy of the forum, permitting the forum to disregard ordinary conffict of laws rules. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y.
288, I 13 N. E. (2d) 424 (1953).
The English case of Leroux v. Brown,2 decided in 1852, gave rise to the
seemingly endless controversy concerning the effect of the forum's statute of

140 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §31: "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed
by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or
undertaking; •.••
(7) Is a contract to bequeath property or make a testamentary provision of any kind."
212 C.B. 801 (1852).
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frauds on contracts drawn in another state or country. This English decision
originated the procedural-substantive interpretation of the statute of frauds by
characterizing section 43 as procedural in its application while labeling section
174 substantive and consequently of no effect upon contracts drawn in other
jurisdictions. A definite split in American jurisdictions over the validity
and reasoning of the Leroux 11. Brown emphasis on the precise language of
the statute, coupled with expanding commercial intercourse and varying types
of statutes of frauds, served to confuse rather than clarify the proceduralsubstantive approach to this problem.5 Criticism of this dual approach to
the forum's statute of frauds has been severe,6 but the sheer weight of many
decisions7 indicates that the courts and counsel in determining a conB.icts
problem involving an oral contract will continue to direct their attention to
a characterization of the forum's statute of frauds. However, the principal
case is illustrative of the courts' ability to render a decision without making
the procedural-substantive characterization.8 A determination that the forum's
statute is substantive may not foreclose the issue of its application, for there
has always been a tendency9 on the part of American courts, as in the principal case, to utilize public policy arguments to prohibit action on foreign
contracts which would be clearly void if made in the forum.10 It is difficult,
if not impossible, to predict11 when a court will employ the public policy
3 The key phrase in §4 of the English Statute of Frauds in 1852 was " .•• no action
shall be brought ••."
4 The phrase in §17 of the English Statute of Frauds in 1852 distinguishing it from
§4 was " .•• no contract shall be allowed to be good.••." This substantive characterization
carried over to many American statutes which declared that the contract was invalid or void.
See Lorenzen, ''The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 YALE L.J. 311 (1923).
5 See 105 A.L.R. 652 (1936); Lorenzen, ''The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of
Laws," 32 YALE L.J. 311 (1923).
6 See Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 YALE L.J. 333
at 344 (1933), in which the author criticizes the present approach and contends that the
forum should apply the rules taken from the foreign system of law unless it means an
unwarranted inconvenience to the forum.
7 See Ailes, "Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," 39 MicH. L. REv.
392 (1941), which criticizes Cook and other writers who have complained of the illogical
procedural-substantive approach. See note 6 supra. Ailes contends that this approach,
deeply rooted in precedent, is, despite its weakness, the best solution yet offered and brings
order into the field of conflict of laws.
s Judge Desmond in a concurring opinion in the principal case contended that the New
York Court of Appeals should have settled this question of whether their statute of frauds
was procedural or substantive as such decisions are the primary function of the court. He
characterizes the statute as procedural and thus a rule of evidence for the New York courts.
9 See 33 CoL. L. REv. 508 (1933) for an excellent collection of cases where public
policy has been employed by the forum.
10 See Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651 (1935), in which the
Delaware court ruled that Delaware's statute of frauds was substantive and in addition that
the public policy of Delaware demands that the statute be so characterized for such an
interpretation protects all Delaware citizens on contracts drawn in Delaware no matter
where the suit is brought. The court thus refused to apply public policy in such a way as
to defeat the plaintiff's action on a New York contract void under the Delaware statute of
frauds.
11 See the opinion of the lower court in the principal case where the court's decision
that public policy did not apply proved wrong. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 107 N.Y.S. (2d)
847 (1951).
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rule to defeat an action on a contract12 but the principal case has solid authority in this application of public policy to a contract to devise or bequeath
property.13 What is, and who determines this public policy is the vexing
and basic problem.14 In the principal case the court envisaged the necessary
public policy in the passage of amendments to the Personal Property Laws15
:in 1933 eliminating the constant stream of lawsuits in the New York courts
based on oral contracts to bequeath property. There is a body of law in a
few states which holds that the statute of frauds in itself is a legislative
declaration of public policy sufficient to bar the forum's enforcement of the
contract, even if the statute is interpreted as substantive.16 However, abundant
authority exists in other jurisdictions rejecting this approach on the theory
that the legislature enacted the statute for the sole purpose of controlling
contracts made in the forum with no thought of declaring a public policy.17
Today, the historical procedural-substantive approach definitely serves a purpose in the disposal of simple cases, but it would seem that in the difficult
cases counsel would do well to examine closely all facets of the particular
fact situation in light of the courts' tendency to submerge the proceduralsubstantive approach in favor of other considerations such as public policy,
special interests of the forum,18 and place of performance of the contract.19
David D. Dowd,

Jr.,

S.Ed.

12 Note 8 supra.
1s Barbour v. Campbell, 101 Kan. 616, 168 P. 879 (1917); Emery v. Burbank, 163
Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895).
14 See Nutting, "Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," 19 MINN. L.
R:sv. 196 (1934), in which it is contended that the legislature and not the courts should
make the declarations of public policy. But see Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,
224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918), in which Cardozo states that legislative enactment or
lack of same is not conclusive as to public policy determination.
15 Note 1 supra.
16 Farley v. Fair, 144 Wash. 101, 256 P. 1031 (1927); Barbour v. Campbell, note
13 supra.
11 Henning v. Hill, 80 Ind. App. 363, 141 N.E. 66 (1923); D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly
& P. Cheese Co., 155 Wis. 541, 145 N. W. 372 (1914); Lams v. F. H. Smith Co.,
note 10 supra.
18 See principal case and argument that New York law should apply because of New
York's various contacts with the case; e.g., it was the domicile of the testator, place for
performance of the contract, and situs of administration of the testator's estate.
19 See also Meylink v. Rhea, 123 Iowa 310, 98 N.W. 779 (1904), where lex rei sitae
and not lex loci contractus was held controlling in a contract for sale of realty.

